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Abstract
Two-dimensional one-way coupled map lattices are used for cryptograph where multiple space
units produce chaotic outputs in parallel. One of the outputs plays the role of driving for synchro-
nization of the decryption system while the others perform the function of information encoding.
With this separation of functions the receiver can establish a self-checking and self-correction
mechanism, and enjoys the advantages of both synchronous and self-synchronizing schemes. A
comparison between the present system with the system of Advanced Encryption Standard, AES,
is presented in the aspect of channel noise influence. Numerical investigations show that our system
is much stronger than AES against channel noise perturbations, and thus can be better used for
secure communications with large noise channel exists in open channels, e.g., mobile-phone secure
communications.
PACS numbers: 05.45.Vx, 05.45.Ra, 43.72.+q
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Since the pioneering work by Pecora and Carrol, chaos-based secure communication has
attracted great attention [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. In the first stage, chaos communication
focused on how to hide secret message in chaotic signals and how to establish communication
links between transmitters and receivers through various methods of chaos synchronization.
After its development of a decade, now any new valuable designs of chaotic cryptosystems
should be examined from the standard evaluations of overall cryptographic properties pop-
ularly used in conventional secure communications. Among these properties, the following
three criterions are the most important: security; efficiency of performance; and robustness
against channel noise (realizability) [11, 12, 13]. In this paper we will focus the property
of resistance against noise disturbances in transmission channels, this property is closely
related to the cryptographic methods and schemes.
For performing secure communications various encryption methods, including conven-
tional methods and chaos-based ones, have been proposed of which all stream cipher cryp-
tosystems can be classified to two schemes, synchronous scheme and self-synchronizing
scheme. Each scheme has its own advantages as well as its disadvantages. Let us con-
sider chaos-based cryptosystems for explaining this matter.
With synchronous scheme both transmitter and receiver use identical autonomous chaotic
systems for encryption and decryption transformations. The synchronization between the
transmitter and the receiver is achieved by choosing same initial conditions, and the cipher-
texts transmitted in the open channel plays no role for chaos synchronization. In this case,
the initial values of chaotic variables often serve as secret the key for the security. A serious
problem of this scheme is that the synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver,
i.e., the realizability of the communication, is unstable against certain mismatches between
the both sides in communication. In particular, this scheme has the following disadvantages.
(i) To be resistant against plaintext-known attacks, one has to use different initial conditions
for different times of communications, i.e., use x0 = a+b,x0 = (x1, x2, · · ·, xm), as the initial
values of the dynamical variables where a = (a1,a2, · · ·, am) is kept unknown for public as
private the key which is unchanged for different communications while b =(b1, b2, · · ·, bm) is
changed in different communications and it is transmitted in open channel. During the open
channel transmission any bit error of b can cause the collapse of chaos synchronization be-
tween the transmitter and the receiver and definitely destroy the whole communication. (ii)
With synchronous scheme, both transmitter and receiver perform parallel chaotic motions,
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any encryption and decryption transformations should be adjusted in synchronized time.
Therefore, any missing of bits or packets of bits in transmitted ciphertexts may break the
synchronization. (iii) Any temporary perturbations in encryption and decryption systems
can definitely destroy the whole communication, and this breakdown cannot be overcome
during the same communication. Nevertheless, synchronous scheme has some advantages
balancing its disadvantages. A remarkable advantage is that the synchronous scheme has
no bit error avalanche effect. The synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver
is realized by taking identical initial conditions, and the transmitted ciphertexts do not play
the role of driving for synchronization of the receiver. Thus, one bit error in the ciphertexts
causes one bit error only in the received plaintext, and the system can be rather robust
against strong noise perturbations in the communication channel.
With self-synchronizing scheme, the encryption dynamics of the transmitter is chaotic,
and the signal transmitted in the open channel now plays double roles of information carryer
(ciphertexts) and the receiver driving for chaos synchronization. The receiver does not take
(and actually does not know) the initial condition of the transmitter, and it reaches syn-
chronization to the transmitter from arbitrary initial condition through the driving of the
transmitted signal. In this case, the self-synchronizing scheme enjoys desirable advantages
of stability of communication. It does not need to transmit initial condition; and it can
automatically recover chaos synchronization and successful communication after any breaks
due to bit or bit packet missing, or due to temporary disorders of the transmitter and the
receiver, because the subsequent driving signal can resynchronize the receiver and avoid
collapse of communication. However, the self-synchronizing scheme has its own disadvan-
tages as well. An error in the driving bit may cause a large number of error bits in the
received plaintexts, this is the so-called bit error avalanche effect. With this effect, the self-
synchronizing scheme becomes weak in resistance against channel noise, and the robustness
of self-synchronizing secure communications in strong noise environment is usually much
worse than the secure communications of synchronous scheme.
All cryptosystems (both chaos-based and conventional ones) can be classified to one of the
above two schemes. It is noticed that typical block cipher systems like Advanced Encryption
Standard, AES, can be regarded to belong to the self-synchronizing scheme because in block
cipher systems the ciphertexts are used as the driving signal of the inverse computations of
the receiver, and they enjoy the advantages of stability of the self-synchronizing scheme as
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well as suffer from the bit error avalanche disadvantage of the same scheme.
The central task of the present paper is to suggest, for the first time to our knowledge,
a cryptosystem based on spatiotemporal chaos which combines the advantages of both syn-
chronous and self-synchronizing schemes and avoid their disadvantages. In [14] we proposed
to use spatiotemporally chaotic cryptosystems to reach high security; in [15] we suggested to
simultaneously use many chaotic outputs from different space units to provide high encryp-
tion (decryption) efficiency; and in [16] we suggested to combine the methods of [14] and [15]
to achieve optimal overall cryptographic properties, i.e., high security and fast encryption
(decryption) speed. In all the above works we used clearly self-synchronizing cryptographic
scheme. In the present paper we will go further from [14] and [16] by separating the trans-
mitted signals to two distinctive parts, one driving signal for the function of synchronizing
the receiver and the other ciphertext signal for the function of information carryer (note, in
the typical self-synchronizing scheme both functions are performed simultaneously by the
same transmitted signal). With this separation of functions, our cryptosystem enjoys all
the advantages of both synchronous and self-synchronizing schemes and avoids their own
disadvantages.
We use the following one-way coupled map lattice [16] for
Encryption transformation:
xn+1(j) = (1− ε)fj [xn(j)] + εfj−1[xn(j − 1)]
f0(x) = 4x(1− x) (1a)
fj(x) = ajx(1− x), j = 1, 2, ..., m
zn+1(0, 0) = (1− ε)f [zn(0, 0)] + εfm[xn(m)]
yn(0, 0) = zn(0, 0)× 2h mod1 (1b)
f(x) = 4x(1− x)
yn+1(1, 0) = (1− ε)f [yn(1, 0)] + εf [yn(0, 0)]
yn+1(0, 1) = (1− ε)f [yn(0, 1)] + εf [yn(0, 0)]
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yn+1(j1, 0) = (1− ε)f [yn(j1, 0)] + ε{0.8f [yn(j1 − 1, 0) + 0.2f [yn(j1 − 2, 0)]},
j1 = 2, ..., N
yn+1(0, j2) = (1− ε)f [yn(0, j2)] + ε{0.2f [yn(0, j2 − 1) + 0.8f [yn(0, j2 − 2)]},
j2 = 2, ..., N (1c)
yn+1(j1, j2) = (1− ε)f [yn(j1, j2)] + ε{0.5f [yn(j1 − 1, j2) + 0.5f [yn(j1, j2 − 1)]},
2 6 j1 + j2 6 N (1d)
Sn(j1, j2) = [Kn(j1, j2) + In(j1, j2)] mod 2
ν ,
Kn(j1, j2) = [int(yn(j1, j2)× 2µ] mod 2ν , 2 6 j1 + j2 6 N (2a)
Dn = [int(yn(N/2, N/2)× 2µ] mod 2ν (2b)
xn(0) = Dn × 2−ν
where parameter aj , j = 1, 2, · · ·, m are kept secret, serving as the private key, Sn(j1, j2) are
ciphertexts, carrying information of plaintexts, and Dn serves as the driving signal. Both
Sn(j1, j2) and Dn are transmitted in the public channel to the receiver. For specific we will,
throughout the paper, take parameters h = 26, µ = 58, ν = 32, ε = 0.99, m = 3, N = 6,
and a1 = a2 = a3 = 3.7.
The decryption transformation of the receiver can be obtained symmetrically by replacing
xn(j), zn(0, 0), yn(j1, j2), the key a = (a1, a2, ..., am), with x
′
n(j), z
′
n(0, 0), y
′
n(j1, j2), and the
test key b = (b1, b2, ..., bm), respectively, and with
x
′
n(0) = xn(0) = Dn/2
ν (3)
or
x
′
n(0) = D
′
n/2
ν
Moreover, the plaintext can be extracted by the receiver as
I ′n(j1, j2) = [Sn(j1, j2)−K ′n(j1, j2)] mod 2ν ,
K ′n(j1, j2) = [int(y
′
n(j1, j2)× 2µ] mod 2ν (4a)
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D
′
n = [int(y
′
n(N/2, N/2)× 2µ] mod 2ν (4b)
By taking the secret key identical to the transmitter bj = aj , j = 1, 2, ..., m, the receiver can
reach synchronization with the transmitter, and then correctly receive the private message
as
y
′
n(j1, j2) = yn(j1, j2), K
′
n(j1, j2) = Kn(j1, j2), D
′
n = Dn
I ′n(j1, j2) = In(j1, j2), 2 6 j1 + j2 6 N (5)
The schematic encrypting structure is given in Fig.1(a). First, we use a 1D lattice chain
of length m = 3 (three circles) for setting the secret keys a = (a1, a2, a3) in Eq.(1a). This
arrangement can guarantee full sensitivity of the encryption processes to all key parameters
on one hand, and reduce as much as possible the number of noncipher sites on the other
hand. Second, following the 1D chain is a 2D one-way coupled map lattice of Eqs.(1c) and
(1d), producing W = 25 chaotic sequences (the square sites of Fig.1(a)), in parallel for fast
encryption. The 2D structure is for reducing the system length and thus effectively reducing
synchronization time and the associated error bit avalanches. And the nearest neighbor and
next to the nearest neighbor coupling structure of Eq.(1c) is for enormously increasing the
cost of any inverse analytical computation attacks. Third, there are two mod operations
Eqs.(1b) and (2a) which may considerably enhance the sensitivity of chaos synchronization
to the key parameter variations, and thus reach high practical encryption security. Finally,
all the square maps output signals in parallel of which the W = 24 empty squares encrypt
plaintexts [Sn(j1, j2) = Kn(j1, j2)⊕ In(j1, j2), see Eq. (2a)] and produce ciphers, and the
single black square produces driving signalDn which does not encrypt any plaintext and feeds
back to drive the coupled maps lattice by xn(0) = Dn/2
ν . The decryption transformation of
the receiver has similar structure to Fig.1(b), where the driving and decrypting are organized
by x
′
n(0) = Dn/2
ν , I ′n(j1, j2) = Sn(j1, j2)⊖K ′n(j1, j2) as defined in Eq.(4a). With bj = aj , j =
1, 2, 3 we can obtain spatiotemporal chaos synchronization between the tranmitter and the
receiver, and thus the receiver can obtain I ′n(j1, j2) = In(j1, j2).
There are two crucial key points of our cryptosystem should be emphasized. First, in
the transmitter we use signal Dn for the feedback xn(0) = Dn/2
ν . Since Dn does not
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make encrypting, the encryption system is autonomous spatiotemporal chaos (with conven-
tional self-organizing scheme, the encryption system is nonautonomous chaos with plaintext
involving in the dynamics). Second, in the receiver the two functions of ciphertexts and
synchronization driving, which are usually played by the same transmitted signal simulta-
neously in self-synchronizing scheme, are now played separately by two different parts of
transmitted bits: Sn(j1, j2) from the empty squares serve as the ciphertexts (which play no
role of driving) while Dn from the black square serves as the driving signal synchronizing
the decryption system (which does not produce ciphers). The most significant point is that
the decryption system can produce a driving signal D
′
n by its own dynamics [see Fig.1(b)],
which must be identical to the transmitted driving signal Dn, D
′
n = Dn, if chaos synchro-
nization between the transmitter and the receiver is achieved. This identity can be used
by the receiver to check the validity of the communication and to correct errors whenever
the transmitted driving Dn is disturbed by noise in the open channel, as we will see later.
This self-checking and self-correcting capacity of the receiver is a great advantage of our
cryptosystem over all known methods of both synchronous and self-synchronizing schemes.
With the above mechanism our cryptosystem enjoys all the advantages of both self-
synchronizing and synchronous schemes, and avoid their disadvantages. On one hand, we
do not need to transmit initial condition for each communication, and do not suffer from the
collapse caused by bit and bit packet loss or by temporary disturbances of the transmitter
and the receiver machines. On the other hand, our system enjoys all the advantages of
synchronous scheme as well. In particular, the bit errors of the transmitted driving signal can
be checked and corrected, and the bit error avalanche caused by the open channel noise can
be practically eliminated. The present cryptosystem has strong robustness against channel
noise. These conclusions will be fully confirmed by the following numerical computations.
First let us specify the detail of numerical simulations of our system. We use two comput-
ers, one serves as the transmitter and the other as the receiver, for simulating chaos-based
secure communications by using Eqs.(1)–(5) with the given parameters for simulations. The
plaintexts In(j1, j2) are arbitrarily chosen. In each communication the initial condition of the
transmitter is chosen as random numbers, and different communications take different ini-
tial conditions. The receiver takes initial conditions also randomly, which are different from
those of the transmitter. Starting each communication, the transmitter first send driving
bits Dn to the receiver only for about 30 iterations in our case (slight less than 1K bits), these
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driving signal bits are enough to synchronize the decryption system. After this transient,
the transmitter send both ciphertexts Sn(j1, j2) and driving Dn in the same open channel,
and then the standard secure chaotic communication works. We simulate noise disturbance
in the open channel by certain bit error rate of transmitted signal that each transmitted bit
has a probability P to alternate its value from 1 to 0 (also from 0 to 1). During the normal
communication the receiver can continually receive the transmitted driving signal Dn and
autonomously produce its own driving signal D′n. The receiver can compare D
′
n with Dn,
and monitor the bit errors between Dn and D
′
n. Suppose the number of error bits between
Dn and D
′
n is En, the receiver can distinguish three different situations. (i) En = 0, the
normal communication will be continued since full synchronization is kept. (ii)
0 < En < A, A≪ ν (6)
then most of bits of Dn and D
′
n coincide with each other, indicating synchronization between
the transmitter and the receiver, and a small number of nonidentical bits are due to the Dn
bit errors caused by the channel noise. In this case, the receiver can use D
′
n replacing Dn
to drive the decryption system for avoiding bit error avalanche of Dn. Here A is chosen to
be ”sufficiently small” that sufficiently many identical bits of Dn and D
′
n convince the chaos
synchronization of the transmitter and the receiver, and ”sufficiently large” that the affect
of channel noise can be effectively eliminated. In our simulations we take A = 8 for the
total ν = 32 bits of Dn (also D
′
n). (iii) If En > A, it is assumed that the synchronization
between the transmitter and the receiver may be broken due to, e.g., bit packet missing or
some temporary disturbance of the transmitter or receiver machines, we thus take Dn as the
driver of the decryption system for recovering the chaos synchronization.
In summary, with condition (ii) [Eq.(6)] we judge successful chaos synchronization be-
tween the transmitter and the receiver with the transmitted driving signal having certain
error bits caused by channel noise, and then we use D
′
n as driving for avoiding bit er-
ror avalanche; with condition (iii) it becomes possible that chaos synchronization may be
broken due to some reasons, we thus use Dn as driving for synchronization and avoiding
possible communication collapse; and with condition (i) chaos synchronization and normal
communication are guaranteed, we can use either Dn or D
′
n = Dn for driving.
Of course, chaos synchronization can be broken even in the case of (ii). The largest
probability for this event to happen once can be easily computed by the error function
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Q1 ≈ 1√
2piνσ
∫ ν
ν−A
e−
(x− ν2 )
2
2νσ dx ≈ 1√
2piνσ
e−
( ν2−A)
2
2νσ
σ =
1
4
(7)
with
ν = 32, A = 8 (8)
we have Q1 ≈ 2× 10−3. And the largest probability for these events to happen successively
J times is
QJ = Q
J
1 ≈ 2J × 10−3J (9)
which goes to zero very quickly as J increases (actually, J=2 is already hardly observable).
Therefore, chaos synchronization breaking due to any reasons can be found almost immedi-
ately, and synchronization can be reestablished easily with the Dn driving.
On the other hand, with function (ii) our system is very strong in resistance against
channel noise. Suppose the bit error probability of Dn caused by channel noise is P. With
Eq.(6) this noise has probability q to cause avalanche
q =
ν∑
k=A+1
CkνP
k(1− P )ν−k ≈
ν∑
k=A+1
CkνP
ke−P (ν−k)
= e−Pν
ν∑
k=A+1
CkνP
kePk (10)
Let us define R as the error rate of the received plaintext
R =
Me
M
(11)
with M being the total number of transmitted ciphertext bits and Me being the error bits
among these M bits. If we have
R ≈ P (12)
the avalanche effect can be regarded to be ineffective and our chaos-based secure communi-
cation is as strong as normal nonsecure communication in resistance against channel noise.
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With (8) and (10), Eq.(12) is valid up to P ≈ 1/30 (then we have q < ∑32n=9 1n! ≈ 2.5× 10−6
probability for a bit to cause an avalanche and a single avalanche can cause about 9 × 103
error bits in our system).
For comparison we also simulate secure communication by applying AES cryptosystem.
This system has an avalanche of 128 bits, i.e., any bit error in the transmitted ciphertext
can cause 128-bit errors in the received plaintext. As a complete comparison we should
investigate all the properties of security, performance and robustness of the cryptosystems.
The security problem has been studies in detail in Refs.[14] and [16] , performance problem
is analyzed in great detail in [16]for software realization. Our chaos-based cryptosystem
has encryption (decryption) speed 2 to 3 times faster than that of AES with 128-bit key
[17] because the former takes parallel outputs and one-round encryption structure. We
have confirmed this conclusion by using different computers and by taking windows 2000
operating system and C compiler (in comparisons, both cryptosystems were computed with
same computers). In the present work we focus on the comparison of robustness of both
systems against channel noise, simulated by bit error probability of the transmitted signal.
In Fig.2 we plot the error rate of the received plaintext R against the channel noise
of error probability P for our spatiotemporal-chaos-based cryptosystem. For each plot we
take M = 105 and < R > is an average of 1000 simulating communications. Complete
information loss is identified when < R >= 0.5. It is remarkable that difference between
our secure communication with regular nonsecure communication (< R > ≫ P ) can be
observed only after P > 1
30
at which any normal (nonsecure) voice communication is no
longer valid. Thus, in our case the operations of information encryption and decryption do
not practically reduce the robustness of communications.
In Fig.3 we do the same as Fig.2 with the AES system investigated. For small P , < R >
vs. P curves show linear relation with slopes approximately equal to 64. This behavior is
well expected based on its 128-bit error avalanche. The curve saturates to < R >≈ 0.5 at
p ≈ 0.03, this is sharply different from Fig.2 where the saturation to < R >≈ 0.5 occurs
at about p ≈ 0.1. And the AES system cannot be used (unless additional bits are used for
error crrections) for voice communication for P > 10−3 at which we have < R >≈ 1
20
, breaks
of communications but our chaos-based system has < R >≈ 1
30
up to P ≈ 1
30
. It is clear
that our spatiotemporal-chaos-based cryptosystem is much stronger than AES in resistance
against channel noise.
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In the investigations of Fig.2 and Fig.3, we consider only bit errors caused by channel
noise, and do not consider influences of bit (or bit-block) loss and temporary disturbances
of the encryption and decryption systems. These errors may cause some temporary commu-
nication breaks for both chaotic and AES systems. However, the drivings in these systems
(driving signal Dn for Eqs.(1) and ciphertexts for AES) can well prevent these breaks devel-
oping to communication collapses. And this is a desirable advantage of both systems over
any cryptosystems of synchronous scheme.
If we consider secure communications in network environment, both synchronous scheme
and self-synchronizing scheme can work stably because the noise strength and the distur-
bance probability of computers are very weak. However, communications with city phone
lines or with wireless channels must deal with much stronger noise perturbations and larger
error probability in communicators. In this case, the large error avalanche of the self-
synchronizing scheme and the possible collapse instability of the synchronous scheme may
cause some serious problems. In the present paper, we have suggested a spatiotemporally
chaotic cryptosystem to practically eliminate the bit error avalanche problem on one hand
and to avoid possible collapse of communication on the other hand, by separating the two
functions of synchronization driving and plaintext encoding to different parts of transmitted
signal. In doing so, all we have payed is to reduce the encryption and transmission efficiency
by 4% (i.e., the driving signal Dn does not produce ciphers which contains 4% of the total
transmitted bits). And this efficiency loss can be further reduced by decreasing the number
of the driving bits. We expect that our cryptosystem can be used in secure communication
applications where large noise exists in the open channel, one of such applications may be
secure communications with mobile phones.
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[1] L. M. Pecora, and T. L. Carroll, Phys. Rev. Lett. 64, 821 (1990).
[2] K. M. Cuomo, and A. V. Oppenheim, Phys. Rev. Lett. 71, 65 (1993).
[3] L. Kocarev, K. S. Halle, K. Eckert, L. O .Chua, and U. Parlitz, Int. J. Bif. and chaos 2(3),
709 (1992).
11
[4] J. K. White and J. V. Moloney, Phys. Rev. A 59, 2422 (1999).
[5] J. Garcia-Ojalvo and R. Roy, Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 5204 (2001).
[6] S.F. Yu, P. Shum, N.Q. Ngo, Opt. Commun. 200, 143 (2001).
[7] J. Y. Kuang, K. Deng, R. H. Huang, ACTA PHYSICA SINICA 50 (10): 1856(2001).
[8] D. G. Van Wiggeren, and R. Roy, Science 279(20), 1198 (1998).
[9] S. Sundar, and A. A. Minai, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85(25), 5456 (2000).
[10] A. T. Parker, and K. M. Short, IEEE. Trans. Circuits Syst I. 48(5), 624 (2001). G.Perez, and
H. A. Cerdeira, Phys. Rev. lett. 74(11), 1970 (1995). C. Zhou, and C. H. Lai, Phys. Rev. E
60(1), 320 (1999); Phys. Rev. E 59(6), 6629 (1999).
[11] L. Kocarev, IEEE circuits syst magz., 1(3), 6 (2001).
[12] F. Dachselt, and W. Schwarz, IEEE trans. Circuits syst. I, 48(12) , 1498 (2001).
[13] Aadreas Abel, and Wolfgang, Pro. of the IEEE 90(5) 691 (2002).
[14] S. H. Wang, J. Y. Kuang, J. H. Li, Y. L. Luo, H. P. Lu and G. Hu, Phys. Rev. E 66, 065202
(2002)
[15] J. H. Xiao, G. Hu, and Zh. L. Qu, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 4162 (1996). G. Hu, J. H. Xiao, J. Z.
Yang, and F. G. Xie, Phys. Rev. E. 56, 2738 (1997).
[16] S. H. Wang, W.P.Ye, H. P. Lu, J. Y. Kuang, J. H. Li, Y. L. Luo, and G. Hu, to be published
in Commu. Theor. Phys. , and can be found in http://arxiv.org, number: nlin.CD/0303026.
[17] See J. Nechvatal et al., http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes
Figure Captions
Fig.1 Schematic figure of encryption system (a), and decryption system (b).
Fig.2(a) The average error rate < R > defined in Eq.(11) against the bit error probability
P in the open channel for our chaotic cryptosystem (1)–(4). For small P we have < R >≈ P,
and the bit error avalanche effect is practically avoided. This avalanche effect can be clearly
observed only after P & 1
30
at which normal (nonsecure) voice communications may not
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work. (b) The blowup of a part of (a). Note: normal scales of < R > are used in (b), unlike
(a) where logarithmic scales are used in both axes.
Figs.3(a),(b) The same as Figs.2(a) and (b), respectively, with AES investigated. It is
clear that the avalanche problem exists for arbitrary P , and voice communications cannot
work for P > 5× 10−4 (at which we have < R >≈ 1
30
).
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